Baghdad Endgame and Afghan Ambiguity
by Jeffrey Laurenti
The president claimed credit, legitimately, for having stuck to his campaign promise and timetable to end the American war in Iraq--an unprovoked war that shredded the credibility of American global leadership. His Republican adversaries were reduced to complaining that Obama had opposed his predecessor's gamble on a big troop increase, or "surge," in the war's fifth year -- though they modestly decline to claim due credit for having started the war in the first place.
Obama was, however, notably more ambiguous about his determination to achieve his complementary campaign pledge to succeed in Afghanistan.
As senator and candidate he consistently backed the American-led effort to assist Afghanistan's post-Taliban republic in securing the country against Al Qaeda. He twice last year gambled on his own big troop increases there.
But last night he emphasized that he hasn't signed up for "open-ended war," and drew this connection between the globally backed "good war" in Afghanistan and the misbegotten "bad war" in Iraq: "as was the case in Iraq, we cannot do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves." His own gamble on a troop surge, he emphasized, is "for a limited time."
So the president used the Iraqi withdrawal milestone to remind his own top military brass, as well as the faltering Afghan government, that this year's surge begins to ebb next August. They will, he signaled, need to show results in reversing the Taliban's momentum of the past five years if they expect the American public to be patient with a gradual drawdown. Obama's pointed reminders of the wars' trillion-dollar cost and the nation's economic travails underscored the stakes for Kabul.
Obama's commitment to start the drawdown next August appears unshakable, but his calculated ambiguity about its pacing is keeping every side in the Afghan conflict off balance. They are all left to guess whether he is planning on keeping a large and only modestly trimmed U.S. troop presence there to grind down the Taliban over the next four years, or is counting on Kabul's success in taking primary security responsibility against the Taliban to allow a shrunken U.S. backup force to stay for the long term, or is expecting Pakistan to deliver its Taliban clients for a peace deal behind the seeming pledge of an American withdrawal.
In the region, it does not go unnoticed that Obama has never expressly stated an intention to withdraw all U.S. forces and bases from Afghanistan, as he unambiguously did on Iraq. This too keeps the Taliban-Islamabad axis a bit uncertain. For all their confidence that the Americans are leaving, they cannot be sure that the powerful Pentagon lobby won't find a way to lock in bases in Central Asia.
Of course, the Taliban relationship with the Pakistani security establishment is itself now coming under strain. Taliban leaders worry about the signs of rapprochement between Pakistan's senior military leaders and Hamid Karzai, including the unexpected announcement of bilateral military exchanges between the two governments as well as their new trade pact. Many Taliban worry about being thrown under the bus in the interest of a broader Pakistani deal--and know that Pakistan's civilian government won't be of any help to them if the military finally cut them loose.
At the moment, then, uncertainty is gripping all sides. Paradoxically, this makes the prospect for finding an Afghan settlement seem faintly possible, for the first time since the chance was fumbled with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Obama is surely hoping that he will be able to announce that a stable Afghanistan allows the withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country, too, before his presidency ends.
But last night he emphasized that he hasn't signed up for "open-ended war," and drew this connection between the globally backed "good war" in Afghanistan and the misbegotten "bad war" in Iraq: "as was the case in Iraq, we cannot do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves." His own gamble on a troop surge, he emphasized, is "for a limited time."
So the president used the Iraqi withdrawal milestone to remind his own top military brass, as well as the faltering Afghan government, that this year's surge begins to ebb next August. They will, he signaled, need to show results in reversing the Taliban's momentum of the past five years if they expect the American public to be patient with a gradual drawdown. Obama's pointed reminders of the wars' trillion-dollar cost and the nation's economic travails underscored the stakes for Kabul.
Obama's commitment to start the drawdown next August appears unshakable, but his calculated ambiguity about its pacing is keeping every side in the Afghan conflict off balance. They are all left to guess whether he is planning on keeping a large and only modestly trimmed U.S. troop presence there to grind down the Taliban over the next four years, or is counting on Kabul's success in taking primary security responsibility against the Taliban to allow a shrunken U.S. backup force to stay for the long term, or is expecting Pakistan to deliver its Taliban clients for a peace deal behind the seeming pledge of an American withdrawal.
In the region, it does not go unnoticed that Obama has never expressly stated an intention to withdraw all U.S. forces and bases from Afghanistan, as he unambiguously did on Iraq. This too keeps the Taliban-Islamabad axis a bit uncertain. For all their confidence that the Americans are leaving, they cannot be sure that the powerful Pentagon lobby won't find a way to lock in bases in Central Asia.
Of course, the Taliban relationship with the Pakistani security establishment is itself now coming under strain. Taliban leaders worry about the signs of rapprochement between Pakistan's senior military leaders and Hamid Karzai, including the unexpected announcement of bilateral military exchanges between the two governments as well as their new trade pact. Many Taliban worry about being thrown under the bus in the interest of a broader Pakistani deal--and know that Pakistan's civilian government won't be of any help to them if the military finally cut them loose.
At the moment, then, uncertainty is gripping all sides. Paradoxically, this makes the prospect for finding an Afghan settlement seem faintly possible, for the first time since the chance was fumbled with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Obama is surely hoping that he will be able to announce that a stable Afghanistan allows the withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country, too, before his presidency ends.
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