Why Reformers Must Forge Ahead
by Maggie Mahar

While others flail about, the Brookings Institution Senior Fellow makes his case in calm, lucid prose, reminding us that nothing has changed over the past month. The House and Senate have, in fact, managed to pass two very similar bills. If you explain the legislation to the public, the majority of Americans favor reform. All that remains to be done is to reconcile those bills—which in the end requires a simple majority.
Aaron begins: “The course of health care reform in 2009 resembled the silent movie series ‘The Perils of Pauline’ in which each episode began with a threat to the heroine’s life but ended with her salvation. Despite repeated near-death experiences, reform legislation passed both houses of Congress. After so many obstacles had been surmounted, the remaining task of reconciling the House and Senate bills seemed doable.”
Then, Scott Brown won in Massachusetts, and although that election was not a referendum on healthcare reform “ it . . . caused something approaching a panic attack among White House and congressional Democrats.” There was no need to lose sight of the goal, Aaron argues, the task ahead was clear.
“The 2009 budget resolution instructed both houses of Congress to enact health care reform. The House and the Senate have passed similar but not identical bills. Since both houses have acted but some work remains to be done to align the two bills, using reconciliation to implement the instructions in the budget resolution follows established congressional procedure.
“Furthermore, coming from Republicans, objections to the use of reconciliation on procedural grounds seem more than a little insincere. A Republican president and a Republican Congress used reconciliation procedures in 2001 to enact tax cuts that were supported by fewer than 60 senators. The then-majority Republicans could use reconciliation only because they misrepresented the tax cuts as temporary although everyone understood they were intended to be permanent — but permanent cuts would have required the support of 60 senators, which they did not have.
“The more substantive objection to the use of reconciliation for passing health care reform derives from the fact that, according to polls, more Americans oppose than support what they think is in the reform bills. It is hardly surprising that people are nervous about health care reform. Most Americans are insured and are reasonably satisfied with their coverage. In principle, large-scale reform could upset current arrangements.
If public perceptions of the intended and expected effects of the current bills were accurate, democratically elected representatives might be bound to heed the concerns. Because the perceptions are inaccurate, reform supporters have a duty to do a better job of explaining what health care reform will do. When participants in focus groups are informed about the bills’ actual provisions, their views become much more positive. The prevailing views have clearly been shaped by opponents’ misrepresentations of the reform plans, which supporters have done little to rebut. Opponents have described as a “government takeover” plans that would cause tens of millions of people to buy insurance from private companies. They have told people that a plan deemed by the Congressional Budget Office to be a deficit reducer is actually a budget buster. They have fostered the canard that end-of-life counseling would mean the creation of “death panels” (a claim that PolitiFact.com labeled “the lie of the year”). They have persuaded Americans that their insurance arrangements would be jeopardized by plans that would in fact leave most coverage untouched, add coverage for millions of Americans, and protect millions of others from cancellation of their coverage and from unaffordable rate increases in the event of serious illness. . . “
[Here it is worth noting that, according to Washington Post/ABC polls released yesterday, when asked whether Congress should keep working to pass comprehensive health-care reform two-thirds of Americans said “yes”—including 88 percent of Democrats 56 percent of independents and 42 percent of Republicans.—mm]
Aaron continues: “Health care reformers in the administration and Congress have a powerful case to make and, on an issue of such enormous importance, a duty to make it. In addition to reminding Americans that reform will protect, not jeopardize, coverage by preventing insurance companies from canceling coverage or jacking up premiums for the sick, reform advocates should remind them that the proposed legislation will bring coverage to tens of millions of currently uninsured Americans and protect it for scores of millions of others. Reform advocates should explain the legislation’s legitimate promise of cost control and quality improvement.
“President Barack Obama has announced a bipartisan meeting on moving the reform process forward. It is an opportunity for all sides to present ideas for improving the bills that already have been passed by both houses of Congress. If modifications are identified that will command the support of simple majorities in both houses, they should be adopted through reconciliation. Then the House should pass the Senate bill.” [It really is that simple. The majority just needs to remember that it is the majority, that it has the support of the public, and that the party must stop negotiating with itself. mm]
Aaaron concludes: “Other strategies, in my view, have no prospect of success. Abandoning the reform effort is the worst strategy of all — not only for reform advocates, but for the nation. Reform advocates are already on record as supporting reform. Voters who oppose reform will not forget that fact come November, and those who support it will find little reason to make campaign contributions to or turn out to vote for lawmakers who were afraid to use large congressional majorities to implement legislation that would begin long-overdue efforts to extend coverage, slow the growth of spending, and improve the quality of care.
“The start-from-scratch and piecemeal-legislation strategies are invitations to time-consuming failure. The Senate would need 60-vote majorities for every component of such reforms. To be sure, lawmakers could craft a different bill that would extend coverage to fewer people than the current bills do. But they could not institute serious insurance market reforms without assuring a balanced enrollee pool — or assure such a pool without mandating coverage. Nor is it politically possible or ethically fair to mandate coverage without offering subsidies for low- and moderate-income people. And it is not possible to prevent those subsidies from increasing deficits without tax increases or spending cuts, which reform opponents won’t support and which would require 60 Senate votes. The call to start anew is naive at best. At worst, it is a disingenuous siren song, luring health care reformers into a political swamp.”
Then, Scott Brown won in Massachusetts, and although that election was not a referendum on healthcare reform “ it . . . caused something approaching a panic attack among White House and congressional Democrats.” There was no need to lose sight of the goal, Aaron argues, the task ahead was clear.
“The 2009 budget resolution instructed both houses of Congress to enact health care reform. The House and the Senate have passed similar but not identical bills. Since both houses have acted but some work remains to be done to align the two bills, using reconciliation to implement the instructions in the budget resolution follows established congressional procedure.
“Furthermore, coming from Republicans, objections to the use of reconciliation on procedural grounds seem more than a little insincere. A Republican president and a Republican Congress used reconciliation procedures in 2001 to enact tax cuts that were supported by fewer than 60 senators. The then-majority Republicans could use reconciliation only because they misrepresented the tax cuts as temporary although everyone understood they were intended to be permanent — but permanent cuts would have required the support of 60 senators, which they did not have.
“The more substantive objection to the use of reconciliation for passing health care reform derives from the fact that, according to polls, more Americans oppose than support what they think is in the reform bills. It is hardly surprising that people are nervous about health care reform. Most Americans are insured and are reasonably satisfied with their coverage. In principle, large-scale reform could upset current arrangements.
If public perceptions of the intended and expected effects of the current bills were accurate, democratically elected representatives might be bound to heed the concerns. Because the perceptions are inaccurate, reform supporters have a duty to do a better job of explaining what health care reform will do. When participants in focus groups are informed about the bills’ actual provisions, their views become much more positive. The prevailing views have clearly been shaped by opponents’ misrepresentations of the reform plans, which supporters have done little to rebut. Opponents have described as a “government takeover” plans that would cause tens of millions of people to buy insurance from private companies. They have told people that a plan deemed by the Congressional Budget Office to be a deficit reducer is actually a budget buster. They have fostered the canard that end-of-life counseling would mean the creation of “death panels” (a claim that PolitiFact.com labeled “the lie of the year”). They have persuaded Americans that their insurance arrangements would be jeopardized by plans that would in fact leave most coverage untouched, add coverage for millions of Americans, and protect millions of others from cancellation of their coverage and from unaffordable rate increases in the event of serious illness. . . “
[Here it is worth noting that, according to Washington Post/ABC polls released yesterday, when asked whether Congress should keep working to pass comprehensive health-care reform two-thirds of Americans said “yes”—including 88 percent of Democrats 56 percent of independents and 42 percent of Republicans.—mm]
Aaron continues: “Health care reformers in the administration and Congress have a powerful case to make and, on an issue of such enormous importance, a duty to make it. In addition to reminding Americans that reform will protect, not jeopardize, coverage by preventing insurance companies from canceling coverage or jacking up premiums for the sick, reform advocates should remind them that the proposed legislation will bring coverage to tens of millions of currently uninsured Americans and protect it for scores of millions of others. Reform advocates should explain the legislation’s legitimate promise of cost control and quality improvement.
“President Barack Obama has announced a bipartisan meeting on moving the reform process forward. It is an opportunity for all sides to present ideas for improving the bills that already have been passed by both houses of Congress. If modifications are identified that will command the support of simple majorities in both houses, they should be adopted through reconciliation. Then the House should pass the Senate bill.” [It really is that simple. The majority just needs to remember that it is the majority, that it has the support of the public, and that the party must stop negotiating with itself. mm]
Aaaron concludes: “Other strategies, in my view, have no prospect of success. Abandoning the reform effort is the worst strategy of all — not only for reform advocates, but for the nation. Reform advocates are already on record as supporting reform. Voters who oppose reform will not forget that fact come November, and those who support it will find little reason to make campaign contributions to or turn out to vote for lawmakers who were afraid to use large congressional majorities to implement legislation that would begin long-overdue efforts to extend coverage, slow the growth of spending, and improve the quality of care.
“The start-from-scratch and piecemeal-legislation strategies are invitations to time-consuming failure. The Senate would need 60-vote majorities for every component of such reforms. To be sure, lawmakers could craft a different bill that would extend coverage to fewer people than the current bills do. But they could not institute serious insurance market reforms without assuring a balanced enrollee pool — or assure such a pool without mandating coverage. Nor is it politically possible or ethically fair to mandate coverage without offering subsidies for low- and moderate-income people. And it is not possible to prevent those subsidies from increasing deficits without tax increases or spending cuts, which reform opponents won’t support and which would require 60 Senate votes. The call to start anew is naive at best. At worst, it is a disingenuous siren song, luring health care reformers into a political swamp.”
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