More Drones in Afghanistan Not a Path to a Winning Strategy
by Neil Bhatiya
The increased use of drones in Afghanistan is not a surprising development. The rise of drone strikes against targets in Pakistan in 2009 is evidence of their attractiveness as a platform for targeting al-Qaeda. An anonymous Marine officer quoted in a Washington Post article about last week’s attack stated: “It has pinpoint precision and it limits collateral damage. The other good thing is you can’t see it or hear it.” It also eliminates the operational exposure of U.S. service personnel during sorties, and drones can fly longer compared to conventional fighter-bomber aircraft. In Pakistan, the CIA has used drones to successfully target high-ranking al-Qaida and Taliban militants. As was visibly evidenced after a suicide bombing which killed seven of its personnel in Khost, drone strikes are the most direct way of hitting America’s enemies.
Yet the increase in drone attacks comes with a corresponding cost. Coalition forces need to focus more attention and resources on building Afghan capacity. When McChrystal took command in 2009, he issued a tactical directive which curtailed the use of air strikes. The UN mission in Afghanistan credits that policy with a reduction in the total number of civilian deaths due to coalition aerial attacks (from 552 in 2008 down to 359 in 2009). He repeated his thinking in an interview with Der Spiegel, saying that killing the enemy should not be the principal objective of U.S. operations. Rather, training Afghan security forces and improving governance need to be emphasized. Last week, his intelligence chief, Major General Michael T. Flynn, published his assessment of U.S. intelligence gathering abilities as a working paper for the Center for a New American Security. In that report, Flynn expressed profound resistance to the idea that killing insurgents deserves such a disproportionate share of limited U.S. and NATO resources. About the use of drones to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives he wrote:
Flynn and his co-authors (Captain Matt Pottinger, a Marine, and Paul Batchelor, of the Defense Intelligence Agency), argue that U.S. intelligence efforts in Afghanistan are too focused on targeting insurgents, at the expense of generating local knowledge. In writing “Fixing Intel,” Flynn appears to be clearly delineating exactly what U.S. strategy should be over the next one and a half years: “lethal targeting alone will not help U.S. and allied force win in Afghanistan.” Andrew Exum, a CNAS Fellow and former adviser to McChrystal’s Spring 2009 strategy review, similarly writes that drone strikes in isolation and apart from a coherent counterinsurgency strategy hurt the U.S. credibility in the region. He also implicitly criticizes the CIA’s reliance on drones in Pakistan: “I fret drone strikes have become a way for a certain agency in the U.S. government to justify its budget share and relevance in the fight against al-Qaeda.”
What Flynn’s report tries to make clear is that, in the long run, expanded drone strikes and other “lethal targeting” might do more damage to U.S. interests in the region, regardless of their immediate tactical benefit and their popularity in Washington. He is correct to argue that there is little gain in being successful at killing insurgents if coalition forces are unsuccessful at building capabilities among Afghans to provide for their own security. This kind of reactive lethality feeds into the widespread belief that the U.S. military principally concerns itself with destroying rather than building. Instead, U.S. forces should de-emphasize their lethal action programs and make the necessary intelligence reforms highlighted by General Flynn in order to aid U.S. operations. They should focus their time and effort on the training of competent and capable Afghan security and police forces, providing the kind of infrastructure to respond to attacks like this past weekend’s Taliban assault on Kabul. The news that NATO will appoint a senior-level civilian leader for its operations is thus welcome news. The U.S. and its allies should also encourage protean efforts at political reintegration and reconciliation, with an eye to drawing both fighters and senior leadership away from the struggle. The death of individual insurgent leaders, though admittedly satisfying, will not end an insurgency absent changes in Afghanistan’s political and social fabric.
Yet the increase in drone attacks comes with a corresponding cost. Coalition forces need to focus more attention and resources on building Afghan capacity. When McChrystal took command in 2009, he issued a tactical directive which curtailed the use of air strikes. The UN mission in Afghanistan credits that policy with a reduction in the total number of civilian deaths due to coalition aerial attacks (from 552 in 2008 down to 359 in 2009). He repeated his thinking in an interview with Der Spiegel, saying that killing the enemy should not be the principal objective of U.S. operations. Rather, training Afghan security forces and improving governance need to be emphasized. Last week, his intelligence chief, Major General Michael T. Flynn, published his assessment of U.S. intelligence gathering abilities as a working paper for the Center for a New American Security. In that report, Flynn expressed profound resistance to the idea that killing insurgents deserves such a disproportionate share of limited U.S. and NATO resources. About the use of drones to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives he wrote:
“Aerial drones and other collection assets are tasked with scanning the countryside around the clock in the hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes. Again, these are fundamentally worthy objectives, but relying on them exclusively baits intelligence shops into reacting to enemy tactics at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency.”
Flynn and his co-authors (Captain Matt Pottinger, a Marine, and Paul Batchelor, of the Defense Intelligence Agency), argue that U.S. intelligence efforts in Afghanistan are too focused on targeting insurgents, at the expense of generating local knowledge. In writing “Fixing Intel,” Flynn appears to be clearly delineating exactly what U.S. strategy should be over the next one and a half years: “lethal targeting alone will not help U.S. and allied force win in Afghanistan.” Andrew Exum, a CNAS Fellow and former adviser to McChrystal’s Spring 2009 strategy review, similarly writes that drone strikes in isolation and apart from a coherent counterinsurgency strategy hurt the U.S. credibility in the region. He also implicitly criticizes the CIA’s reliance on drones in Pakistan: “I fret drone strikes have become a way for a certain agency in the U.S. government to justify its budget share and relevance in the fight against al-Qaeda.”
What Flynn’s report tries to make clear is that, in the long run, expanded drone strikes and other “lethal targeting” might do more damage to U.S. interests in the region, regardless of their immediate tactical benefit and their popularity in Washington. He is correct to argue that there is little gain in being successful at killing insurgents if coalition forces are unsuccessful at building capabilities among Afghans to provide for their own security. This kind of reactive lethality feeds into the widespread belief that the U.S. military principally concerns itself with destroying rather than building. Instead, U.S. forces should de-emphasize their lethal action programs and make the necessary intelligence reforms highlighted by General Flynn in order to aid U.S. operations. They should focus their time and effort on the training of competent and capable Afghan security and police forces, providing the kind of infrastructure to respond to attacks like this past weekend’s Taliban assault on Kabul. The news that NATO will appoint a senior-level civilian leader for its operations is thus welcome news. The U.S. and its allies should also encourage protean efforts at political reintegration and reconciliation, with an eye to drawing both fighters and senior leadership away from the struggle. The death of individual insurgent leaders, though admittedly satisfying, will not end an insurgency absent changes in Afghanistan’s political and social fabric.
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