My Afghan Problem
by Stephen Schlesinger

Like many others, my doubts about the US mission in Afghanistan have grown substantially over the past several years. While I think America was justified in toppling the Taliban government in 2001 for harboring the Al Qaeda criminals who killed 3000 US citizens and foreigners through their suicidal airplane assaults on New York and Washington, at the same time today I am wondering whether the cause we are fighting for in Afghanistan now is the same that Washington embraced eight years ago—namely, to eliminate Al Qaeda.
First, the remnants of Al Qaeda have over the past half-decade scattered and
most reside in Pakistan, so we are now mainly fighting the Taliban, a local,
not a global fundamentalist insurgency, in Afghanistan. Second, we have already
about 68,000 troops in that country but we are primarily defending the nation’s
few big cities, and little of the countryside, making our mission, in
geopolitical terms, a limited one and one no longer concerned about liberating
a nation. Third, General McKrystal’s strategy, to provide security for Afghans
while we build up the Afghan military and police forces, doesn’t seem very
workable as long as the Afghans realize the US will ultimately leave the
country. Fourth, the Karzai regime on whose behalf we are fighting, is corrupt,
and, after a rigged election, also illegitimate, so we no longer are working
with a legal government. Fifth, in pursuing all of these policies, we are
spending billions of tax dollars a day, which could be put to use in solving
our vast economic problems at home.
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