A Dispatch from the Green Zone

Amid the din of incoming-fire sirens that have punctuated life in the Green Zone, news of political developments has largely been absent.  My current stay in Baghdad has coincided with continuous large-scale military operations and an almost complete lack of movement on political issues. This is not particularly surprising when judged against the dismal track record of the Iraqi government in working towards a sustainable political accommodation since the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004 and the transfer of sovereignty. However, the focus on the Sadr City offensive and the long-anticipated launch of a major military offensive in Mosul targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni extremists has clouded understanding of the precariousness of the current state of affairs.

With discussion and coverage of military actions overshadowing the pressing political questions that will shape the future of Iraq, it is easy to forget that tactical military gains cannot form the basis of national reconciliation without corresponding political achievements. This truism has been voiced rightfully since it became clear that the U.S. troop surge, in conjunction with the Jaysh al-Mahdi ceasefire and the turning of key Sunni Arab tribes in al-Anbar province and former insurgent groups, known as Sons of Iraq, resulted in significant security gains. Yet it is worth repeating in light of the focus on current military events in Iraq.

While the long-term prospects of the tentative ceasefire between Jaysh al-Mahdi and the al-Maliki government are still unclear, for someone in the Green Zone, the absence of incoming fire sirens for two days is a welcome change. But a ceasefire, even if it is advantageous to the al-Maliki government, which is far from clear based on the discrepancies in public interpretation of the terms of the agreement, is not a significant achievement in and of itself. This is heightened by the fact that the one benchmark that is currently being discussed, namely, the provincial elections law, which had its first reading in parliament last week, is intimately bound up with the issues presented by the government of Iraq’s struggle with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi.

While the al-Maliki government has proclaimed its actions against the Sadrists as a desire to be rid of illegal militias and criminal elements, the current focus on the Sadrists has political motivations as well in light of the looming provincial elections and the Sadrists relative electoral strength among poorer Shiites. Without getting bogged down in the wider debate about the wisdom of the crackdown on the Sadrists, suffice to it to say that it is often difficult to differentiate between militias outside the control of the central government and those sectarian militia forces, such as the Badr Brigades, who have carved out a role within the state. Any attempt to freeze out the Sadrist bloc from participation in provincial elections on account of their connection to the militia forces that make up the diffuse Jaysh al-Mahdi will inflame the precarious situation and encourage the Sadrists to further seek power outside of the bounds of the political arena. If the Sadrists see their very survival at stake, Muqtada al-Sadr and his political allies might come to rely on the worst elements of Jaysh al-Mahdi, which often operate outside any coherent chain of command and have engaged in sectarian excesses and organized criminal activity. It will also further complicate national politics, as the Sadrists maintain one of the largest political blocs in parliament; this will be the case until national elections are held in 2009.

With respect to other key benchmarks and critical issues, the political process seems to have come to a standstill. In discussions with a number of high-level Iraqi officials, it is clear that the current military operations have taken precedence to the exclusion of the salient political issues, jeopardizing the sustainability of the reduction in violence.

Contrary to sporadic press reports, there has been little movement in the negotiations on hydrocarbon legislation, a key benchmark that implicates the future nature of the state. Similarly, while the need to incorporate elements of the tribal awakenings, the sahwat, and the Sons of Iraq into the security forces has been widely acknowledged, the Shiite-led government of al-Maliki has been loath to reward these Sunni forces, some of whom participated in the insurgency, and remains skeptical of their allegiance to a Shiite-led state. Viewed through the prism of sectarian calculation, they are seen as a military counterweight to the central government and the potential core of a Sunni fighting force should the country slip back into full scale sectarian civil war. And the issue of Kirkuk looms on the horizon. While the various parties have temporarily turned over management of aspects of the issue to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the larger questions as to Kirkuk’s regional affiliation, the fate of those residents of the city displaced by Saddam Hussein, and the administration of property disputes remain far from resolution.

Troop levels in Iraq cannot be sustained at current levels for an extended period of time without doing significant damage to the readiness of the U.S. military. Therefore, the window during which the United States can leverage its military predominance to effect political change is necessarily limited. Minimizing the damage of the invasion and occupation of Iraq can only be accomplished through political means. U.S. military and diplomatic leaders should not lose sight of the fact that the success of their mission is dependent on national political reconciliation and not just military measures, as it appears that their Iraqi counterparts have lapsed into political behavior that will insure future deterioration of the security gains of the past year.